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THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
IN THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS-
The indeterminate sentence is'a penal commitment; the-outer
limits of which are normally set either legislatively or judicially,
with the exact extent of actual time served to be decided adminis-
tratively by correctional officials. Since even those states which pur-
port to retain a definite sentence now provide for some form of
early, conditional release 'on parole, every convict in prison today
is serving a term whose length is affected by the exercise of agency
discretion.1 Furthermore, in addition to the power to release, the
indefinite sentencing structure vests the discretionary authority in
prison Officials to render a multiplicity of daily decisions involving
the control, treatment, and discipline of those who remain incar-
cerated. Until very recently these decisions have remained exclu-
sively within the province of the correctional authorities, while the
courts maintained a "hands-off" attitude toward the penal sys-
tem. 2
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the recent trend
of judicial intervention into the correctional authorities' adminis-
tration of the indeterminate sentence. Initially, the theory and
origins of this form of commitment will be explored, as well as its
most frequent legislative formulations. The pattern of judicial in-
tervention will then be analyzed in relation to the variety of agency
decisions which constitute the totality of institutional controls over
the inmate. First, essentially prognostic decisions will be scruti-
nized against a fourteenth amendment standard of procedural due
process; and secondly, those decisions involving classification and
treatment during incarceration will be measured against an eighth
amendment standard of cruel and unusual punishment. Although
the primary focus will be on the administration of indeterminate
1. See NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN STATE & FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
ADULT FELONS, table 12 (1966).
2. See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from
Mempha v. Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 3 (1968), where the author succinctly characterizes
the current dilemma:
A combination of extremely broad legislation, narrow judicial review, and the
consignment of most of the legally relevant issues to matters of privilege rather
than right has created a situation of virtually uncontrolled, unreviewable discre-
tion in the administration of the correctional process.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sentencing laws per se,3 the element of agency discretion which is
now implicit in all penal commitments will make the discussion of
legal standards equally applicable to those sentences which retain
the nominal designation of "definite."
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
The earliest forms of punishment, such as the universal appli-
cation of the death penalty in eighteenth century England, were
most definite ones. Similarly, when the notion of extended incar-
ceration was introduced as an amelioration of the earlier forms,
the length of confinement was pre-set and relatively immutable.4
A prisoner was simply committed for a term ot jears without any
possibility for early release. While the focus was on the special de-
terrence of the offender, as well as on the general deterrence of the
rest of the population, the rationale remained exclusively retribu-
tive.
In the nineteenth century several trends coalesced to change
the thrust of the penal system from retribution to rehabilitationr
One factor was the rising incidence of crime and recidivism. An-
other, and perhaps the primary factor, was the century's emphasis
on the scientific method accompanied by an optimistic belief that
its proper application could be a panacea for any problem.0 The
social theorists believed that inmates could be reformed by a
proper prison regimen which drew on an existing body of scien-
tific knowledge for its methodology. Under this theory, eventually
christened the "rehabilitative ideal," 7 a criminal offense was no
longer considered a willful act of misconduct to be punished. In-
stead, criminality was analogized to a disease which was, in most
cases, curable. The focus was on a special deterrence of the indi-
vidual offender, while ignoring the general deterrence of potential
3. Although a selective number of state and federal cases will be discussed, the opera-
tion of the New York statute will be emphasized.
4. Radzinowicz & Turner, A Study of Punishment I: Introductory Essay, 21 CAN. B.
REV. 91 (1943), in S. KADISH & M. PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES 125 (2d ed.
1969).
5. Radzinowicz & Turner, A Study of Punishment I: Introductory Essay, 21 CAN. B.
Rav. 91 (1943), in S. KADISH & M. PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 125 (2d ed.
1969).
6. D. MARTINDALE, THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 3546 (1960).
7. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CiRus. L.C.
P.S. 226 (1959).
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violators. It was no doubt believed that a thorough treatment of
all offenders would eventually eradicate all criminality.8
In the 1840's and 50's, several prison reform programs based
on the rehabilitative theory were unsuccessfully initiated. In 1870
the New York Prison Society, spurred by Zebulon Brockway, held
the first national conference on the newborn science of "penol-
ogy." 9 The ideal of prisoner rehabilitation was repeatedly
stressed and the conference resulted in a wholesale affirmation of
the humanitarian approach to prison administration. These no-
tions lay dormant for almost two decades until in the late 1880's
there was a substantial demand by legislators and penologists to
implement the theories of the 1870 Convention." Significantly,
one of Brockway's proposals was for an indeterminate sentence
during which the penologists would have ample time to "treat"
and "cure" the "diseased" offender.11 This concept of confine-
ment was quickly adopted by several state legislatures 12 and at
the turn of the century it was extolled as:
the only single sentence which can be applied in all cases with
justice. By it the judge commits a convict to the reformatory just
as a doctor commits a sick, injured, or insane person to a suitable
8. In H. BoiEs, THE SCIENCE OF PENOLOGY 91 (1901) the author poses an unnerving
alternative to the theory of general deterrence. "The criminal code must now pass beyond
the limit of the overt act, and reach down to include in its care all the dangerous elements-
the offspring of criminals, the uncared for children who are constantly recruiting the
criminal class,--and effectively stop by its prohibitions and the seclusion of the deceased
propagation of depraved offspring."
9. See Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation,
20 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 365, 365-72 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Singer, Prison Conditions].
10. Id. at 371. Professor Singer suggests that the advent of organized labor exerted a
pressure on state legislatures to curtail the competition resulting from the low-cost prison
production of marketable goods. With the subsequent elimination of the profit motive, the
thoughts of legislators and penologists apparently turned to more philosophical goals.
11. Prior to his appointment as head of New York's Elmira Reformatory, Mr. Brock-
way had drafted an indeterminate sentence law. His proposed measure outlined the follow-
ing features for the Elmira system.
1. Prisoners would be committed for an indefinite period. Release was to be de-
termined by the behavior and capacity of the prisoner.
2. The status and privileges to be accorded the prisoner would be determined by his
behavior and progress.
3. Education would be compulsory.
4. Provision would be made for the parole of carefully selected prisoners.
C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONs 20 (2d ed. 1964).
12. In 1900, eleven jurisdictions had enacted indeterminate sentence laws while twenty
had adopted parole. UNrED STATES DEP'T JusticE, Arr'y GEN. SURVEY OF RELFA sE PROcE-
DuREs 20 (1939), in Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 528,530 (1958).
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hospital until cured, and for the same reasons. It is absurd to com-
mit a person in whom this symptom [of criminalty] has been
detected to a prison for ten or thirty days, six months, or a definite
number of years, as for a doctor to commit an insane or other
patient to the hospital for the same limited terms. 3
By 1950, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia had
adopted one of the various statutory formulations of the indeter-
minate sentence, and 57.6 percent of the prison population in the
United States were incarcerated for indefinite terms.14 Further-
more, by 1967, even those states which had retained a so-called
"definite" sentence statute had adopted one or more of the post
conviction devices to allow for the discretionary release of an in-
mate before the expiration of the maximum sentence for which he
was committed. 15 Thus, the element of administrative discretion
had been introduced, in varying degrees, into virtually every penal
commitment.
II. STATUTORY FORMULATIONS
The amorphous quality of the indeterminate sentence ema-
nates as a direct result of the statutory discretion which is vested
in prison officials. This delegation of authority is based on two
postulates. First, prison authorities possess an expertise which al-
lows them to make fine distinctions regarding the diagnosis and
therapy necessary for rehabilitation, and secondly, their total con-
13. H. BolEs, THE ScIENCE OF PENOLOGY 90 (1901).
14. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FED-
ERAL INsTITUTIONS, table 12 (1954).
15. The AmE=IC.AN CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 113-15
(3d ed. 1966) lists four procedures by which a prisoner can be released from a correctional
institution. In all cases the time of release is, in varying degrees, influenced by correctional
authorities.
I. Parole-certain prisoners are selected to serve the remainder of their sentences out-
side of the prison, but under supervision.
2. Mandatory (conditional) release-the prisoner must be released when the accumulated
time received for good behavior and extra institutional credits are deducted from
the sentence. Depending on the particular statute, this can be up to one-third of a
prisoner's maximum.
S. Conditional pardon-a form of executive clemency granting release on condition that
specified rules are complied with.
4. Discharge-occurs at the expiration of the maximum term and is neither condi-
tional, nor supervised. Confinement until the expiration of the maximum sentence
presupposes that, for one reason or another, the inmate was denied his "good time."
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trol of the inmate affords them a unique opportunity to formulate
a prognosis.16
The diverse formulations of the indeterminate sentencing stat-
utes which have been enacted in the various states are, in them-
selves, significant in several aspects. In the first instance, these laws
reflect a legislative intent to import some of the traditional aims
of the penal sanction into the post-adjudicative processY.17 How-
ever, the very complexity of the statutory constructions also indi-
cates a legislative desire to structure and confine the discretion
delegated to correctional officials in order to insure the proper
implementation of the chosen priorities (i.e., deterrence, preven-
tive detention, or rehabilitation). Ideally, a statute would allocate
a fair quantum of discretion by granting prison officials enough
power to supervise and to rehabilitate their wards, but would not
delegate enough to allow for abuse. Although easily articulated,
this apportionment has proved difficult to achieve in practice.
A. The Completely Indeterminate Sentence
The indeterminate sentence, as conceived by Brockway and
the other nineteenth century reformists, meant a completely un-
limited commitment with neither a maximum nor a minimum.
The offender was simply committed to the custody of the prison
officials for life or until he was considered cured.' Two powerful
forces, "legalism and realism," were sufficient to prevent a wide
scale enactment of this form of sentence.' 9 Traditional notions
such as those of personal liberty and due process, a skepticism con-
cerning administrative discretion as applied to rehabilitation, and
a legislative insistence for a deterrent factor, led to a complex sys-
tem of statutes in which maximum terms were generally em-
ployed.20 The last remnants of the unlimited commitment may,
16. See Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes,
75 HARv. L. Rav. 904, 915-29 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kadish, Legal Norm and Discre-
tion].
17. It has been suggested that the criminal sanction performs a threefold function:
deterring future violators, rehabilitating criminals and insulating society from dangerous
offenders. Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUm. L. REv.
1261 (1937).
18. Z. EROcKWAY, Furry YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE 126 (1912).
19. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 528,
530 (1958).
20. Id.
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however, still be observed in certain so-called "psychopath" stat-
utes under which a criminal is confined for a term of from "one
day to life." 21
B. Legislatively Set Maxima and Minima
Under the second type of statutory formulation, such as that
used in California, a sentencing judge commits a criminal defend-
ant to prison not for a fixed term of years, but rather for the term
"prescribed by law." 22 Each offense in the California Penal Code
sets out both a maximum and a minimum term. The defendant
is committed, in theory, for the duration of the maximum term
with the precise limits to be set by the California Adult Authority
after a study and examination of the offender.2 This formulation
indicates a legislative desire to satisfy the major aims of the crimi-
nal sanction. While the set minimum is aimed at deterrence and
the maximum at the protection of society from dangerous offend-
ers, the broad discretion delegated to correction authorities allows
for the individual's rehabilitation. However, because the "spread"
between the fixed maximum and minimum is usually substan-
tial,24 this scheme may be criticized as vesting an untoward dis-
cretion in the correctional authorities while seriously circum-
scribing the power of judicial review, either upon or after the
pronouncement of sentence.
C. Legislatively Set Maxima-Judicially Set Minima
Under a third formulation of the indeterminate sentence as
proposed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code,
the sentencing court would retain the authority to impose a mini-
mum sentence.2 This provision seems sound in that it affords the
21. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 31 B, §§ 6(a), 9(b) (1971). In Maryland, a person
adjudged a sexual psychopath is committed for an indeterminate period with neither a
maximum nor a minimum, even though his conviction may have been for a misdemeanor.
See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) where the court held that confinement
under an indefinite psychological commitment is cruel and unusual punishment in the
absence of a meaningful program of treatment.
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970).
23. Sturm v. Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967); In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690,
171 P. 958 (1918). But see Hester v. Craven, 322 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1971) holding that
once a maximum is set the Adult Authority may not extend it by administrative action
without according the inmate due process of law.
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West 1970). Whenever an injury is inflicted in
the course of a robbery, the sentence range is from 15 years to life.
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961). See generally
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465 (1961).
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court some discretion to mete out a term as a special deterrent to a
particular offender. In contrast to the minimum, the maximum
sentence would be predetermined by the legislature and auto-
matically imposed by the court. This maximum, which gives an
immutable quality to the legislature's estimation of the serious-
ness of the offense, may encourage some undesirable judicial
practices. For instance, under this scheme, the only manner in
which a trial court judge could impose a sentence in accordance
with his notions of the offender's culpability would be to arrange
or allow a reduction of the original charge. Furthermore, where
practices such as this are commonly followed, the prosecutor's
ability to force a reduced plea will be considerably enhanced.2 6
The most radical innovation of the Model Penal Code is the
provision for a separate and mandatory term of parole. Under
this scheme the inmate would receive, in effect, two separate terms,
one for confinement and another for conditional release.2 7 Thus,
while the inmate would become eligible for parole at the expira-
tion of his minimum confinement term, he would become entitled
to release on parole at the completion of his maximum confinement
sentence. This formulation appears to seriously limit the parole
board's power by mandating parole at the expiration of a fixed,
and relatively low, minimum.28 However, given the parole board's
power to revoke a parole and to re-commit a parolee for the re-
mainder of his "second" term, without a judicial hearing,29 the
correctional authorities' discretionary powers are left substantially
unscathed.
D. Judicially Set Maxima and Minima
The fourth prototype of the indeterminate sentence statute,
such as has been enacted in New York, allows the sentencing judge
to set both the maximum and the minimum term within prede-
termined legislative limits.30 This rather complex statute, which
mandates indeterminate commitments for all felonies, attempts to
26. See Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effects Upon Systems for Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 495, 500-07 (1958).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.10 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
28. Id. § 6.06. The Code's minimum sentences are comparatively low. See Tappan,
Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 528, 541 (1958).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.10 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961). The length of this
second term would be indefinite-from one to five years. Id. § 6.10 (2).
30. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1967).
941
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apportion authority between the courts and correctional authori-
ties by carefully structuring the discretionary powers of each.
The sentencing court must set a minimum for a "Class A"
felony,31 and may at its discretion set a minimum of not less than
one year for any other crime. The judicially set minimum may not
exceed one-third of the allowable maximum.2 In the event that
the court does not set the minimum, it will be fixed by the State
Board of Parole after receiving and examining the offender.3 8
The sentencing judge retains a similar genus of discretion
with respect to setting a maximum sentence. Unlike the minimum
sentence, however, the court must set a maximum within the sta-
tutory limitations prescribed for the offense. 4 The sentencing
court may not set a maximum at less than three years. 5
Despite the statute's attempt to allocate a fair balance of dis-
cretionary authority to the courts, as well as to the correctional au-
thorities, there appears to be in practice a frustration of this
scheme by judicial abdication. While the court is required to set
a maximum sentence in all cases, it must set a minimum only for
a "Class A" felony. In the other four classes of felonies the court
may defer this decision to the correctional authorities."" Because
of the paucity of accurate data available at the time of sentencing, 7
the court will, in most cases, allow the minimum to be set by
the Board of Parole. Furthermore, the absence of data regarding
the individual defendant may logically lead the court to set a rea-
sonably high maximum on the theory that the Parole Board will
be in a better position to assess his potential for rehabilitation after
a period of confinement. Under these circumstances, the board is
31. Id. § 70.00 (3)(a).
82. Id. § 70.00 (8)(b).
83. Id. § 70.00 (3)(c). The State Board of Parole must follow the procedure set forth
in N.Y. CoRutc. LAw § 212 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1971).
34. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (2) (McKinney 1967).
85. Id.
86. N.Y. CoRREC. LAW § 212 (2) (McKinney 1968) provides that a minimum set by the
Board of Parole shall have the same force and effect as a judicial determination.
87. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 144 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME].
88. Although the New York State Board of Parole held a total of 3,767 minimum date
and release determinations in 1970, the statistics do not reflect the percentage of minimum
date determinations in relation to the total number of new prisoners received. STATE OF
N.Y. FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE AcTIVITSs OF THE BOARD OF PAROLE AND THE DIVISION
OF PAROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPT 7 (1971). This information was gleaned from a con-
versation with the Buffalo Area Director of Parole on Nov. 24, 1971.
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left with the authority not only to fix the minimum sentence
when the inmate is eligible for parole, but may also continue his
confinement up to the maximum set by the court. Traditionally,
an inmate's ability to obtain a judicial review of these discretion-
ary "administrative" decisions has been seriously circumscribed by
a judicial attitude of non-intervention in penal affairs3 9
III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE DECISION TO RELEASE
Traditionally, the pronouncement of sentence has affected a
drastic change in the status of the offender. The individual's fun-
damental rights and freedoms vanish and are replaced, in the
name of prison discipline, by a vaguely defined system of privileges
which, for all practical purposes, confer an absolute power upon
prison authorities over his every movement. The Supreme Court
of Illinois has characterized this transition in the following terms:
Any person indicted stands before the bar of justice clothed with a
presumption of innocence and, as such, is tenderly regarded by the
law. Every safeguard is thrown about him .... [After sentencing,
however,] [i]nstead of being clothed with a presumption of inno-
cence they are naked criminals, hoping for mercy but entitled only
to justice.40
The discretionary power of prison authorities which accom-
panies this transformation has grown as a natural result of the in-
determinate sentence. As criminal sentences became more flexible
and different types of correctional programs with varying degrees
of freedom and rehabilitative potential developed, a delegation of
complete and almost unchecked discretion to the prison authori-
ties seemed to be dictated by logic as well as necessity.41 Thus, in
1967, the President's Crime Commission noted that:
Today . .. an offender may be sentenced for an indeterminate
length of time, with his release depending on the decision of cor-
rectional authorities .... And he may be subjected to special dis-
39. See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) where the court
stated that: "We think it well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend
the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from im-
prisonment those who are illegally confined."
40. People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 864, 368, 33 N.E.2d 872, 875, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586
(1941).
41. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion, supra note 16, at 916.
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cipline or punishment on the basis of determinations from which
he has no appeal.4 2
Traditionally, the divestiture of a prisoner's legal rights lim-
ited the role of the judiciary to the interpretation of correctional
statutes and the review of a limited range of administrative deci-
sions.43 The courts reasoned that decisions involving the custody
and control of convicts were best left to prison officials who were
assumed to possess an expertise in such matters.44 Furthermore, it
seems logical to assume that state courts felt an obligation to re-
spect the legislative delegation of administrative authority to prison
officials, while notions of federalism were a further restriction on
the ability of federal courts to intervene in cases involving state
prisoners. In short, the judicial policy expressed was one of "hands-
off."
The "hands-off" doctrine represented a judicial disinclination
to become involved in any aspect of prison affairs. 5 However, in
declining to intervene in cases involving a prisoner's early release,
the courts often chose to rely specifically on the "grace" con-
cept. 46 Thus, whenever the length of an indeterminate sentence
was constitutionally attacked for uncertainty, the courts upheld its
legality by holding that the commitment was, in effect, for the stat-
utory maximum.4 7 Since the commitment was for the maximum
term prescribed by law, it followed that any diminution was a
mere privilege, not a right, which came to the prisoner as a matter
of "grace," dispensable only at the discretion of the correctional
authorities. 48
The so-called right-privilege distinction may be criticized as
42. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME at 179.
43. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 985 (1962).
44. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion, at 926-29.
45. The implications of the various formulations of the concept are explored in Note,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
46. In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935) Justice Cardozo's words that
"[s]uspension of a sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime" were
uttered in a case involving federal probation. They have, however, been frequently applied
to militate against any rights relating to parole.
47. While the Supreme Court's holdings in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
and in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) have occasionally been construed to
mean that "excessive" length is a basis for unconstitutionality, the overwhelming majority
of cases hold that sentences within statutory limits are legal, regardless of length. The cases
are catalogued in Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Baxter v. Commonwealth, - Mass. -, 268 N.E.2d 670 (1971).
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an inappropriate standard for measuring an inmate's potential for
liberty for several reasons. First, judges normally take such factors
as "good time" reductions and parole eligibility into account when
passing sentence. Therefore, it may be argued that a decision to
postpone conditional release beyond the judicial minimum op-
erates, in effect, to increase the sentence intended by the trial court
judge.49 Secondly, extended incarceration under an indeterminate
sentence is based on the notion of individual treatment for the pur-
pose of rehabilitating the inmate, which does not depend on official
benevolence. Given this purpose, it becomes absurd for the correc-
tional authorities to claim that an inmate has the "right" to re-
lease only at the termination of his maximum, which may occur
long after he has maximized his rehabilitative potential. Con-
versely, it is equally nonsensical for a prisoner to demand a "right"
to parole before he is ready to re-enter the mainstream of society.
Since the modern penological focus is on the individual and his re-
formation, a more positive approach would seek to ensure the uti-
lization of adequate criteria to measure eligibility, as well as
procedural fairness in the administrative determination.
Although the right-privilege distinction was long accorded a
talismanic effect when invoked to sustain the constitutionality of
administrative discretion, related developments have greatly weak-
ened its potency50 Specifically, Goldberg v. Kelly,"' Shapiro v.
Thompson,52 and Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy 53 have been cited in several cases involving prisoners as
evidencing a general dilution of the right-privilege distinction.
This attenuation, developed primarily to affect other areas of ad-
ministrative law, is being successfully transposed to the correc-
tional process to circumscribe the discretion of penal authorities
whenever an inmate's liberty is in issue. 4
49. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process,
45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 827 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kadish, Peno-Correctional Process].
50. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
51. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). A recipient of welfare payments was held entitled to due
process before termination of the payments.
52. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). A state statute which required a one year waiting period as a
prerequisite to the receipt of welfare payments was held unconstitutional.
53. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The Court held that a security clearance could not be sum-
marily revoked.
54. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting); Hester
v. Craven, 322 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (right to procedural due process at re-
945
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It should be noted that the current abrogation of the "hands-
off" and "grace" doctrines tends to mandate the procedural stric-
tures of the fourteenth amendment only when the correctional
decision has some effect on a prisoner's actual, or potential for,
liberty. Whenever some lesser interest such as internal discipline
or classification is involved, the courts have been unwilling to re-
quire the same integrity of the fact finding process.5  While the
distinction may sometimes be regretted when considering an in-
dividual case, its rationale is understandable when viewed from a
broader perspective. The limits of judicial expertise, as well as the
need for administrative efficiency, militate against the requirement
of a hearing for the multiplicity of cases involving daily "house-
keeping" decisions which are an integral part of the operation of
every prison. Thus, to suggest that the denial of television privi-
leges merits a full-blown hearing with a right to judicial review
is absurd. However, when a decision is made which affects a pris-
oner's liberty, the necessity for a fair administrative hearing is
clear. Furthermore, the judiciary has sufficient expertise, acquired
in other areas of administrative review, to inquire into the pro-
cedural integrity of the determinative process.
In abrogating the "hands-off" doctrine, progressive courts
have begun to invoke the fourteenth amendment's requirements
of procedural due process to ensure the fairness of the administra-
tive fact-finding process. In thus attempting to redress prisoners'
grievances, some judges have assumed an attitude which borders
on the paternalistic,5" while other have, thus far, continued to
maintain the traditional posture of "hands-off." 57 Due to the
present state of judicial turmoil, a brief survey of the current status
of official discretion in such crucial areas as "good time" credits,
parole release, and parole revocation may aid the practitioner in
structuring an inmate's complaint by serving to illustrate the di-
rection of future trends.
determination of sentence); People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d
238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971) (right to counsel at parole revocation hearing); People ex rel.
Maggio v. Casscles, 28 N.Y.2d 415, 271 N.E.2d 517, 322 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1971) (right to counsel
at parole revocation hearings made retroactive).
55. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Ill.
1963).
56. In Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) the trial court judge partici-
pated in the negotiation of new grievance procedures and generally acted as an arbitrator
between the prisoners' attorneys and prison officials.
57. See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969).
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A. Deprivation of Good Time Credits
Most prison systems operate under a statutory scheme in
which a prisoner who participates in rehabilitative programs and
conforms to prison rules is permitted to earn a reduction in the
actual length of his incarceration. The decision to grant such a
reduction has traditionally been viewed as purely administrative,
and therefore, not judicially reviewable. In New York, an inmate
may earn ten days "good time" for each month served, thereby re-
ducing his maximum sentence by as much as one third. 8 The
legislative intent in enacting this statute was no doubt to create a
strong incentive for the prisoner to engage in rehabilitative pro-
grams. However, in the hands of prison officials, the rehabilitative
incentive has often been subordinated, while the statute has
become primarily an administrative tool to deter prisoner miscon-
duct."9 Furthermore, despite the direct effect on a prisoner's lib-
erty, the dispensation of "good time" credits has been administered
in the same manner as any other disciplinary punishment. 0
Since the deprivation of "good time" credits has a direct and
substantial effect on a prisoner's potential for liberty, there is a
strong movement to introduce the requirements of procedural reg-
ularity into the correctional decision-making process. The Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice,6' the American Correctional Association, 62 as well as sev-
58. N.Y. PENAL LAWi § 70.30(4) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
59. See Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L.
REv. 795, 831-32 (1969) where the authors suggest that "good time" reductions allow the
prison administrators to "buy off" the rights of their wards.
60. 7 N.Y. OFFICIAL COMPILATION CODES, RUL.S AND REGULATIONS § 253.4 (1970) pro-
vides for the revocation of a prisoner's good time credits at a "Superintendent's Proceed-
ing" where an inmate may "comment" on the factual allegations, but may not call witnesses
or cross-examine. These lost credits are, however, subject to restoration by a "Time Allow-
ance Committee" made up of prison officials. Id. § 261.3.
61. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTONS 86 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT:
CORRECTIONS].
Where . . . [disciplinary] charges may lead to a substantial loss of good time and
a resultant increase in the actual length of imprisonment, the prisoner should be
given reasonable notice of the charges, full opportunity to present evidence and to
confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses, and the right to representation by
counsel.
62. While the Association does not recommend that a hearing conform to the pro-
cedural regularity of a trial, it does accord the inmate an opportunity to be heard.
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL AWS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 410-11 (3d ed. 1966).
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eral progressive courts,63 have agreed that a prisoner is entitled
to reasonable notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine witnesses before being deprived of his accrued good conduct
credits.
In Sostre v. McGinnis,4 the court held that a state prisoner
had a fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process be-
fore the normal course of "good time" accrual could be interrupted
by the imposition of penal discipline (solitary confinement). How-
ever, the court refused to mandate a full trial-type hearing. In
Royster v. McGinnis,5 a three judge district court invoked the
equal protection clause to strike down a state statute which al-
lowed prison authorities to ignore "good time" credits accrued
while awaiting trial in a county jail. In United States ex rel.
Rodriguez v. McGinnis,6 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district courts' decisions in three consolidated cases
where federal relief was granted to remedy an unconstitutional
deprivation of "good time" credits, notwithstanding the failure by
state prisoners to exhaust state remedies. Decisions such as these
indicate that judicial concern in the administration of "good time"
statutes is beginning to impose the strictures of the fourteenth
amendment on prison officials.
B. Parole Release
Under any statutory formulation, the discretionary power of
the correctional authorities to grant or deny parole is the factor
which contributes most heavily to the amorphic quality of the in-
determinate sentence. In New York, an inmate with an indetermi-
nate sentence becomes eligible for conditional release on parole at
the expiration of his minimum term. Thereafter, the decision to
63. See United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 947 (1969); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kritsky v.
McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971);
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
64. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court declined to specify "what process was due." Id. at 196.
65. 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S.
Feb. 8, 1972) (No. 71-718).
66. Nos. 34567, 35300, 9- 35253 (2d Cir., Jan. 25, 1972).
67. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70A0(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1971). The minimum may be set
either judicially or administratively; however, in no event may it exceed one-third of the
inmate's maximum term.
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grant him his liberty rests solely with the New York State Board
of Parole. 8
In Ughbanks v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court held that
eligibility for parole is a privilege, "a question of state policy ex-
clusively for the State to decide, as is also the procedure to ascer-
tain the fact, as well as the kind or amount of evidence upon which
to base its determination." 11 Similarly, the New York courts have
held that the granting of parole is a matter of "grace" 70 and that
the parole board's discretion is not judicially reviewable in the
absence of a statutory violation.71
In 1970 the twelve member New York State Board of Parole
held 8,930 parole hearings and released 62.7%, of those eligible.
7 2
Since parole release decisions require a panel of three board mem-
bers, 73 there were a total of 26,790 individual "member judg-
ments" rendered during that year, each one of which had a very
direct and immediate effect on an inmate's potential for liberty.
In view of the tremendous number of parole decisions which
are made each year, the standards which the board applies in as-
sessing an inmate's parole "readiness" become extremely rele-
vant.74 The only explicit statutory language is phrased essentially
in terms of a negative-when the board may not grant a parole.75
In the absence of positive legislative standards, it is natural to ex-
pect that the parole board would act to promulgate affirmative
standards to govern its release decisions. In fact, the New York
68. See N.Y. CoRRmc. LAw § 210 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1971).
69. 208 U.S. 481, 488 (1908). But see Arciniega v. Freeman, 92 S. Ct. 22 (1971).
70. People ex rel. Ochs v. La Vallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 80, 307 N.Y.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't
1969).
71. Hines v. Board of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 56 N.E.2d 572 (1944); People ex rel. Wash-
ington v. La Vallee, 34 App. Div. 2d 603, 308 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dep't 1970).
72. STATE OF N.Y. FAarS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE AcrvITIEs OF THE BOARD OF PAROLE
AND THE DIVISION OF PAROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE DEP'T 7 (1970).
73. N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
74. Commissioner Russell Oswald, Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole,
describes the optimal time for release on parole in these conclusory terms:
The ideal time for parole release, in the judgment of the Board, is when it is felt
that continued confinement will serve no useful purpose for the individual and
wlien his release will not unduly threaten the safety of society nor be incompatible
with its welfare.
Oswald, Decisions! Decisions! Decisions!, 34 FED. PROB. 27 (March 1970).
75. N.Y. ConREc. LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1971) provides that:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the board
of parole is of the opinion that there is a reasonable probability that, if such
prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating. the law.
and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.
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State Board of Parole, as well as most other boards, has consistently
refused to state the criteria which it relies upon when granting or
denying a parole. Thus, exempted from the duty to promulgate
standards 76 and immunized from the rigors of judicial review,7
the danger is always present that a decision by the board will be
based on the members' own estimation of the inmate's culpability
for the crime for which he was committed,78 or even for crimes for
which he was never formally charged.7 This failure to articulate
standards has been criticized as violative of the most basic pre-
cepts of administrative law.s0
Even more regretable than the board's failure to articulate
criteria for release is its refusal to give reasons for the denial of
parole. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis suggests that this policy dis-
regards the recognized "advantages of openness" 81 and leads to
the likelihood that abuses of discretion will "go uncorrected." 82
Furthermore, the uncertainty which this procedure generates may
well embitter the inmate by making the decisional process seem
hostile and insensitive to his interests. Lastly, the articulation of
reasons for denial would not be an unbearable administrative bur-
den. The board's statement need not be extensive since perhaps,
more than its precedent value, it is the personal reflection which
an articulation of reasons entails which is desirable. 3
In Briguglio v. Board of Parole,4 the New York Court of Ap-
peals further immunized the board's decisions from inspection by
76. O'Connor v. Board of Parole, 270 App. Div. 93, 58 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d Dep't 1945).
The board's discretion was held valid despite the absence of affirmative standards.
77. People v. Pierre, 34 App. Div. 2d 1000, 312 N.Y.S.2d 686 (2d Dep't 1970). In the
absence of a violation of a positive statutory requirement, the board's refusal to release a
prisoner was held to be not judicially reviewable.
78. See Gaylin, No Exit, 243 HAR'ER'S 86, 90 (Nov. 1971) where the author suggests
that the Federal Parole Board's decision to deny parole to the majority of draft evaders,
while invariably granting it to those who were members of Jehovah's Witnesses, was based
on an estimation of the evaders' religious sincerity.
79. Cf. Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
80. See K. DAVis, DISCRMONARY JUsTIc 126-33 (1971).
81. Id. at 129.
82. Id. at 128.
83. In Kadish, Peno-Correctional Process, supra note 49, at 831-32, the author aptly
states some of the evils which an articulation of reasons would alleviate:
Under the pressures of an intolerable work load and an almost impossible task, it
is the human response for boards to fall into habits and routines which make
their daily task more readily manageable-cursory interviews, hasty reviews of
reports, half considered dispositions, handy but crude rules of thumb to govern
dispositions.
84. 24 N.Y.2d 21,246 N.E.2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969).
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denying inmates the right to counsel at parole release hearings.,,
The court examined the legislative scheme and reasoned that since
the prisoner was "under active administrative supervision" a "full
adversary-type hearing" was unnecessary.8 6 Mempha v. Rhay 17
was distinguished as "purely a sentencing case" whose safeguards
did not apply after the judicial sentencing process had termi-
nated.' The role of counsel in New York, as well as in many other
states, is thus limited to aiding the inmate in preparation for his
hearing.
It has been claimed that the promulgation of standards would
tend to "minimize the value of parole." 89 However, the absence
of affirmative standards works a detrimental effect which is at least
twofold °0 First, this absence may actually harm the rehabilitative
process by removing the appearance of fairness from the decisional
process. In terms of therapeutic value to the inmate, this appear-
ance may be just as important as its actuality. Secondly, without
standards, reasons, or judicial review, each parole board decision
becomes sui generis which in no way compels the board to be pro-
cedurally fair or even consistent." Despite the good (or even the
bad) intentions of the parole board members, the very ambiguity
which a closed release process generates has been criticized as vio-
lative of the most basic tenets of administrative fairness. 2
There are encouraging signs that the courts are beginning
to take heed of the professorial censure which has been leveled at
parole board practices.9 3 In Monks v. Board of Parole,94 the Su-
85. Since Briguglio dealt solely with the right to counsel at a parole release hearing,
it was unaffected by the court's subsequent acknowledgement of a right to counsel in a
parole revocation determination. People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267
N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
86. 24 N.Y.2d at 28, 246 N.E.2d at 516, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
87. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
88. 24 N.Y.2d at 25, 246 N.E.2d at 514, 298 N.Y.2d at 707.
89. Oswald, Decisions! Decisions! Decisions!, 34 FED. PROB. 27, 31 (March 1970).
90. Even in the absence of promulgated standards, it seems fair to assume that a
major factor in the board's decision to release is the degree of conformity to institutional
rules. See Elliott, Parole Readiness: An Institutional Dilemma, 28 FED. PROB. 26 (March
1964).
91. K. DAvis, supra note 80, at 129. In discussing the absence of affirmative standards
for parole boards the author queries whether "any men, even good men, [should] be un-
necessarily trusted with such uncontrolled discretionary power?"
92. See Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in
Law and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243.
93. Id. See also supra note 91.
94. 58 NJ. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
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preme Court of New Jersey mandated the parole board to specify
reasons for the denial of parole to an eligible inmate. In Sturm v.
California Adult Authority,9" the court held that while an in-
determinate sentence inmate may not have a "right" to a sentence
less than the maximum, he is "entitled to have the time he must
serve determined in a manner consistent with the Constitution." 91,
Decisions such as these indicate that it is unlikely that the isola-
tion of the parole board from the strictures of procedural due
process will long continue. Furthermore, the right to counsel,
which has been established in revocation hearings, seems a clear
precursor of a similar right in release hearings.97
C. Parole Revocation
The rationale for denying an inmate the right to procedural
due process in his parole release determination is that parole is a
privilege, not a right, which comes administratively to the prisoner
solely as a matter of "grace." Since it is also held that a prisoner on
parole has no more rights than when incarcerated, 98 it follows
that the parolee has no right to procedural due process before his
parole is revoked and he is reconfined.9 9 Although the Supreme
Court has held that a presently enjoyed interest is protected by
procedural due process,100 the parolee's enjoyment of his "con-
ditional" liberty has been distinguished by relying on the right-
privilege dichotomy of Escoe v. Zerbst.'01
While a parolee's release is given on the condition that he
abstain from criminal acts, most statutes also provide for revoca-
tion for noncriminal "technical" violations. 0 2 Thus, because an
95. 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967).
96 Id. at 450.
97. See Caldwell, Counsel in Parole Hearings, 43 N.Y.S.B.J. 469, 471-72 (1971) where
the author, a member of the New York State Board of Parole, predicts that: "Counsel's
allowance into revocation hearings seems [to indicate] a clear probability of counsel's entry
into [parole release] hearings .... "
98. In Anderson v. Corrall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923) the Court reasoned that "[w]hile
. . . [parole] is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment."
99. United States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 251 F. Supp. 773 (D.C. Pa. 1966).
100. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
544 (1968) (disbarment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (adjudication of a juvenile delin.
quent).
101. 295 U.S. 490 (1935). The Escoe holding was recently relied upon to preclude the
right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing. Baxter v. Commonwealth, - Mass. -
268 N.E.2d 670 (1971).
102. See, e.g., N.Y. CoRREc. LAiW § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1971). A warrant must be
obtained within 24 hours after reincarceration.
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inmate on parole remains in the fictional custody of the warden,"0 3
a parole officer may order his reincarceration, either with or with-
out a warrant, whenever he has "reasonable cause" to believe that
the parolee has violated an "important aspect" of his parole. 0 4
Relying on the decline of the right-privilege distinction, as
well as the Supreme Court's decisions allowing the right to counsel
at probation revocation, 1o5 there are a growing number of courts
which are moving to accord a parolee a portion of his procedural
rights at a parole revocation hearing. In People ex rel. Mene-
chino v. Warden,10 6 the New York Court of Appeals joined this
minority by mandating the right to counsel at a parole revocation
hearing. This right was later made contingently retroactive in Peo-
ple ex rel. Maggio v. Casscles.10 7 The court's chief concern ap-
peared to be in maintaining the integrity of the fact-finding
process when the parolee's liberty was in issue. However, recog-
nizing the need for administrative efficiency, the court in Mene-
chino declined to require a full trial-type hearing and limited the
participation of counsel to insuring "that the board is accurately
informed of the facts before it acts . . . .,, Although the
court's restriction is understandable, it appears quite likely that
the counsel-limitation rule will be short-lived. It seems inevitable
that even a limited participation by counsel in this previously for-
bidden area of administrative law will generate a flurry of litiga-
tion which will, in turn, establish other procedural rights.109
103. People v. Santos, 81 App. Div. 2d 508, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 25
N.Y.2d 976, 252 N.E.2d 861, 305 N.Y.S.2d 365, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 969 (1969).
104. N.Y. CoRutc. LAiW § 216 (McKinney 1967).
105. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
106. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971). For an analysis of the
court's rationale and the implications of its holding see Note, 20 BuFFALo L. Rav. 713
(1971). Cases interpreting statutory language providing for an "opportunity to appear" as
granting an implicit right to appear with counsel are catalogued in id. at 717 n.21.
107. 28 N.Y.2d 415,417-18, 271 N.E.2d 517, 519, 822 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (1971). The right
to counsel at a parole revocation hearing was held retroactive only to the extent that a
prisoner could "demonstrate, with the aid of counsel . . . , that the determination made
at the revocation hearing failed to meet due process standards."
108. 27 N.Y.2d at 388, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
109. See Arciniega v. Freeman, 92 S. Ct. 22 (1971), where the Court held that a parole
board cannot act to revoke parole in the absence of demonstrable evidence of a violation.
In Hester v. Craven, 322 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the district court mandated that
the parole board must accord the parolee his full measure of due process rights before
redetermining his maximum sentence. On November 18, 1971, in an unreported decision,
a Wyoming County court reversed the New York State Parole Board's determination to
revoke a parole and ordered the inmate freed forthwith. The basis of the court's holding
was that the parole board has the burden of proof in a parole revocation proceeding. The
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In short, in those cases where a prisoner's liberty, either pres-
ent or future, turns on the parole board's determination, the cur-
rent judicial trend is to circumscribe the board's discretionary
powers and to accord the prisoner his fourteenth amendment right
to procedural due process. This approach seems sound. Given the
indefinite quality of the indeterminate commitment, it seems nat-
ural to view all administrative decisions which operate to extend
incarceration over the statutory minimum as de facto extensions
of the sentencing process.1110 When correctional determinations
which affect a prisoner's liberty are seen as a series of delayed sen-
tencing decisions, the "grace" theory quickly breaks down and it
becomes necessary to require the same rectitude of the adminis-
trative process which we require of its judicial counterpart. In-
deed, the stake for the prisoner remains the same in both instances
-his liberty.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN CUSTODIAL DECISIONS
The traditional judicial disinclination to become involved in
any aspect of correctional decision-making was expressed in terms
of a "hands-off" policy."" This reluctance has been especially
abiding whenever the courts have been called upon to review a
mere "custodial" decision, as opposed to one involving an in-
mate's liberty."2 Furthermore, when dealing with the former
type of correctional determination, the courts have held that the
procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendment are an in-
appropriate check on the administrative resolution of these so-
called "internal discipline" decisions.13 Although the very
quantity of the "routine" decisions which are necessary to the
operation of any prison makes them peculiarly suited to institu-
tional resolution, the customary practice of judicial noninterven-
court urged the state to appeal to secure an appellate division ruling. Warren v. Mancusi,
Wyoming County Habeas Corpus File # 4319 (decided Nov. 18, 1971).
110. See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403,414 (2d Cir. 1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
111. See supra text at notes 41-44.
112. In Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969) the court stated that:
We have consistently adhered to the so-called 'hands-off' policy in matters of
prison administration according to which we have said that the basic responsibility
for the control and management of penal institutions, including the discipline,
treatment, and care of those confined, lies with the responsible administrative
agency and is not subject to review unless exercised in such a manner as to con-
stitute clear abuse or caprice upon the part of prison officials.
113. Siegel v. Ragan, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
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tion may be explained on a more legalistic ground-the absence
of a legal right held by the inmate and redressable by the courts.
In order to wage a successful constitutional attack against an
aspect of his confinement, a prisoner must first demonstrate that a
fundamental right has been violated. A literal reading of the eighth
amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" ""
makes this seem the logical vehicle for redressing a prisoner's
grievances. Although the language of the amendment clearly speaks
to post-conviction incarceration, its early history has seriously
hampered any attempts at a broad construction." 5 However, de-
spite its historical limitations, there are recent indications which
point to the eighth amendment's emergence as a potent inmate
right. The amendment's evolution will raise two distinct ques-
tions for judicial resolution. First, what kinds of disciplinary pun-
ishment are prison officials prohibited from imposing? And
second, do correctional officials incur an affirmative duty to pro-
vide indeterminate sentence inmates with a meaningful program
of rehabilitation?
A. The Administrative Imposition of Disciplinary Punishment
When applying the eighth amendment's prohibition to in-
tervene in the administrative imposition of punishment for a
breach of prison rules, the most formidable impediment which
faced the judiciary was the lack of legal standards by which to
measure disciplinary practices.
In cases involving the physical abuse of inmates, the problem
of standards was relatively simple. The immediate stimulus for
the passage of the eighth amendment was the desire to prevent the
recurrence of certain bizarre and barbaric forms of punishment." 6
Furthermore, the early decisions had construed the amendment in
this light by prohibiting punishments which were "manifestly
cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking
on the wheel or the like .... , So, when confronted with the
less barbaric forms of modern punishment which still entailed
some form of physical abuse, the question was merely one of de-
114. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.
115. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Law,
79 HARv. L. REV. 635 (1966).
116. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. Rlv. 839 (1969).
117. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 186 U.S. 486, 446 (1890).
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gree. Thus, using a physical brutality rationale, the eighth amend-
ment has been held to prohibit such forms of prison discipline as
beating with a leather strap,118 inhumane conditions of solitary
confinement,"x9 and physical abuse by prison guards. 20
While early decisions indicated that the eighth amendment
included cases involving bizarre forms of physical mistreat-
ment,'21 later cases sought to restrict its prohibitions to these
barbaric practices. 2 2 However, in Weems v. United States,2
Trop v. Dulles,124 and Robinson v. California,12 the Supreme
Court has clearly established the amendment's applicability to
cases which involve "no physical mistreatment, no primitive tor-
ture." 126 However, the understandable dilemma in applying a
constitutional standard based on "nothing less than the dignity of
man," 127 which acquires "meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice," 18 and now clearly prohibits
overt physical brutality, to cases involving the non-physical impo-
sition of prison discipline, has led some courts to accord an un-
toward deferrence to the expertise of penal authorities. Thus,
courts have allowed prison officials to defeat the claims of inmate-
plaintiffs merely by asserting that a particular practice was neces-
sary to maintain prison discipline. 20 While the courts have held
that prison discipline need not always take precedence over hu-
118. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
119. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp.
786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
120. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.). Ark. 1970).
121. See text at supra note 117.
122. See, e.g., Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914) where a state statute
mandating vasectomy for all twice convicted felons was upheld.
123. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Twenty years confinement at hard labor for the crime of
falsifying a government ledger was held to be disproportionate, excessive and uncon-
stitutional.
124. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Revocation of citizenship as punishment for a crime was held
to be cruel and unusual.
125. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). State's imposition of punishment for the "status" of narcotics
addiction, without an actus reus, was held to be cruel and unusual.
126. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
127. Id. at 100.
128. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
129. In Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969),
the court held that a state prisoner was not entitled to a hearing before being placed in
solitary confinement for a violation of prison rules. In Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp.
415 (D. Md. 1966), the court found that confining a naked inmate in solitary at a tempera-
ture of forty degrees was a valid exercise of prison discipline.
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mane liberties,130 the measure of the prisoner's as well as the
state's burden of proof is nevertheless unclear. Professor Richard
Singer poses an interesting solution to the eighth amendment's
problem of standards by suggesting that, since the modern purpose
of prison is rehabilitation, the proper standard against which to
measure a penal practice is whether it serves a valid rehabilita-
tive goal.1' 1
To date, judicial intervention into the disciplinary aspect of
correctional decision-making has left the following results. When
penal discipline involves the deprivation of a prisoner's actual-or
potential for-liberty, the procedural requirements of the four-
teenth amendment appear to be the most viable restriction on
administrative discretion.13 2 When a disciplinary practice involves
physical brutality, the eighth amendment's prohibitions are an
available restraint on prison officials. However, when neither lib-
erty nor brutality is involved, the legal standards for confining
correctional discretion remain unclear and will no doubt have to
be established on a case-by-case basis. The crucial factor is that
the courts have begun to abandon their "hands-off" inclination
when prison discipline is involved and are now willing to under-
take the formulation of these standards. 83
B. The Indeterminate Sentence and a Rehabilitative Right
It seems clear that the conceptual switch from the definite to
the indefinite sentence was motivated by a penological desire to
rehabilitate rather than to punish the individual. 3 4 Furthermore,
despite the on-going debates about the primary aim of the criminal
law, there exists a considerable consensus that the primary goal of
130. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (statutory right to habeas corpus could not
be infringed upon in the name of prison discipline); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F.
Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison newsletter could not be banned in the absence of a
showing of clear and present danger).
131. Singer, Bringing the Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and the
Eighth Amendment, 39 CINCINNATi L. REv. 650, 677-84 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Singer,
Bringing the Constitution to Prison].
132. In Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the district court
recognized that a prisoner is entitled to the protections of procedural due process when-
ever the imposition of penal discipline causes a "grievous loss" of certain rights and com-
forts. In addition to the loss of liberty through the equivalent of "good time" loss the court
found that a prisoner had a due process right whenever prison discipline effected a loss in
some of his already "limited comforts." Id. at 780.
133. "[r]here are increasing signs that the courts are ready to abandon their tradi-
tional hands-off attitude .... TASK FORcE REPORT: CoRREcrIONS, supra note 61, at 83.
134. See text at supra notes 5-13.
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a prison system should be to rehabilitate.";5 This purpose has
been accepted by both the American Law Institute in its Model
Penal Code 136 and the American Correctional Association.18 7
Its validity is further reflected in the current penological maxim
that "an offender is sent to an institution as punishment, not for
punishment . "... 1 3
Despite a clearcut academic consensus, no court has ever gone
so far as to hold that the sole purpose for incarceration under an
indeterminate sentence is rehabilitation. The attenuation of the
physical brutality requirement of the eighth amendment begun in
Weems and revitalized in Trop has, however, led several courts to
cite the lack of a meaningful rehabilitation program as a factor
contributing to a decision of unconstitutionality.Y8 9 This growing
trend received considerable impetus in Holt v. Sarver,140 in which
a federal district court cited the lack of a rehabilitative program
as one factor in declaring the entire Arkansas prison system un-
constitutional. However, the district court was unwilling to accord
the absence of a rehabilitative program an independent signifi-
cance, stating:
This Court knows that a sociological theory may ripen into con-
stitutional law; many such theories and ideals have done so. But
this Court is not prepared to say that such a ripening has occurred
as yet as far as the rehabilitation of convicts is concerned.141
The holding in Holt is important in at least three aspects.
First, although the court was reluctant to order changes which
would involve expenditures of more money than prison officials
then had available, the court recognized that no change would be
effected unless it took the initiative to mandate a broad reform. 2
Secondly, the court clearly recognized that the lack of a meaningful
rehabilitative program is a factor in the legality of a prison system.
135. See generally Singer, Bringing the Constitution to Prison, at 671-77.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (2) (b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
137. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS Xxii, Princi-
ple XXII (3d ed. 1966).
138. Singer, Prison Conditions, supra note 9, at 388.
139. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir.
1968).
140. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
141. Id. at 379.
142. Id. at 385.
SYMPOSIUM COMMENTS
Third, the court's holding acknowledges the rehabilitative ideal's
potential for growth from a sociological theory to a legal right.
143
While the right to a rehabilitative program has grown almost
imperceptibly as applied to the general prison population, it ap-
pears to be reaching early fruition in cases involving the commit-
ment of mental patients and narcotics addicts.
In the evolving area of the right to treatment, a prisoner
committed for an indefinite term to a mental institution currently
enjoys the dearest right to demand treatment as a condition prece-
dent to his continued incarceration. 44 Indeed, the concept of a
rehabiltative right seems to have developed as a concomitant of the
developing "right to treatment" for those civilly committed.145 It
is generally felt that a criminal who is sentenced to a penal institu-
tion must be accorded the same treatment as those civilly commit-
ted when he is transferred to a mental hospital.146 Furthermore,
any incarceration beyond the maximum sentefice must meet the
standards of due process.147
Closely analogous to the mentally ill prisoners who are con-
fined in prison hospitals are the "diseased" 148 drug addicts who
are statutorily confined to state and federal reformatories for an
indefinite term, the exact limits of which are determined by the
Narcotics Commission.'"4 Given that the purpose of committing
143. Id. But see People ex rel. Popino v. Warden, 31 App. Div. 2d 788, 296 N.Y.S.2d
873 (1st Dep't 1969), where the court was most skeptical about the existence of a rehabilita-
tive right.
144. In Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968), a criminal
defendant, committed to a mental institution as unfit to stand trial was incarcerated eleven
years beyond his maximum term. The court awarded him $300,000 in damages after finding
that he had never received the proper treatment necessary to recover.
145. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The coprt intervened t6
mandate a program of "treatment" for a criminally insane inmate who had been committed
to a mental institution. Although the case was decided on statutory grounds, the court
implied that it might have found a right to treatment even in the absence of a statute. Id.
at 453, 455.
146. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
147. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
148. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962), the Supreme Court held that
narcotic addiction is an illness which cannot be punished per se.
149. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.15 (a) (McKinney 1967) provides for the mandatory commit-
ment of narcotics addicts who are arrested for misdemeanors. Misdemeant addicts may then
be confined for anywhere up to a maximum of thirty-six months under the provisions of
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 208 (4)(a)(2) (McKinney 1969). Similarly, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.15 (b) allows for the discretionary commitment of the majority of addict felons, who
may be confined for a maximum of sixty months under N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §
208 (4)(b) (2) (ii).
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a drug addict for an indefinite term, which may be considerably
longer than the penal sentence for his crime, 10 is rehabilitation, it
seems clear that a meaningful rehabilitative regimen should be
his right. While at least one New York court has endorsed the logic
of this theory, it declined to "thwart the legislative purpose
in enacting . . . the Mental Hygeine Law by prematurely inter-
ferring in its mechanics." 151 This "wait-and-see" attitude of the
judiciary is not, however, dispositive of the right to treatment for
narcotics addicts. Since the status of drug addiction, like that of
mental incompetency, is legally classed as an "illness" and not a
crime, it seems inevitable that the precedents established in the
field of mental commitments will be imported to the field of nar-
cotics commitments to secure a similar right to treatment.
Notwithstanding its potential for growth from a sociological
theory to a legal right, the "rehabilitative right" concept of the
eighth amendment has a real utility when applied to correctional
decisions which involve the custody and control of an inmate while
confined. Thus, the amendment may now be used to require an
affirmative program of treatment for certain "kinds" of inmates
serving indeterminate sentences (i.e., mental commitments). Fur-
thermore, even in the absence of an affirmative duty to provide a
rehabilitative program, there are indications that the correctional
authorities may not interfer with an inmate's self-initiated activi-
ties if they serve a valid rehabilitative functionY.12
The eighth amendment is not a panacea for all prison prob-
lems. However, its weaknesses may be satisfactorily compensated
by the evolving concept of procedural due process to form a full
spectrum of rights with which to begin redressing prisoners'
grievances.
150. The maximum sentence for a misdemeanor in New York is one year. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 1967). By being committed as an addict, instead of a misdemeant,
an individual runs the risk of incurring as much as two years additional confinement. See id.
151. People ex rel. Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 58 Misc. 2d 57, 64,
295 N.Y.S.2d 276, 282 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 31 App. Div. 2d 718, 296 N.Y.S.2d 553, aff'd, 24
N.Y.2d 850,248 N.E.2d 518, 301 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1968)
152. In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Court held that prison officials could
not curtail the activities of a so-called "jail house" lawyer who was engaged in the activity
of writing writs for other inmates. Although the case was decided on the basis of a statutory
right to habeas corpus, it is certainly conceivable that the Court could have found a
legitimate rehabilitative interest in the inmate's exercise of his literary skills had this issue
been squarely presented.
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V. CONCLUSION
In a limited sense, the instances of judicial intervention may
be seen as an unrelated series of reactions to specific forms of
prison abuse. In a broader sense, however, the current tendency
to structure and confine the discretionary authority of prison of-
ficials represents a judicial disenchantment with the administra-
tion, rather than the objectives, of the indeterminate sentence.
Thus far, its goal of inmate rehabilitation has been universally
proclaimed as salutory and may even be seen as an evolving stan-
dard for evaluating penal procedures. Furthermore, when inter-
vening in the correctional process, the courts have not taken issue
with a methodology based on individualization. Rather, the trend
of decisions indicates that the principles of penal administration,
however worthy, must give way when they abridge fundamental
legal rights.5 3 To suggest an abandonment of the indeterminate
sentence and a return to the definite commitment would be folly.
However, the disharmony between correctional practices and the
developing judicial standards for prisoners' rights indicates that
an accommodation is necessary if the mutually held goal of re-
habilitation is to be realized. It is submitted that correctional
administrators must assume the burden of initiating this reconcil-
iation with the judiciary by acting to formulate and promulgate
explicit rules and procedures for the governance of their wards.
In acknowledging the ambiguity which the present ad hoc deter-
minations inevitably generate, the President's Crime Commission
has recently stated that, in the first instance, it would be prefer-
able for correctional authorities to formulate their own standards
for decision-making.
It is important that correctional administrators who are most
knowledgeable about the problems involved, develop policies and
procedures which will accommodate the needs of the system as
well as the interests of convicted offenders. The more adequate
such internal controls are, the less it will be necessary for courts
153. Although the evolution of prisoners' rights has not been confined exclusively to
the federal system, its growth rate does seem faster there. Therefore, the most effective
course for a state prisoner, who is confronted with a solid line of decisions against him,
is to base his grievance on constitutional grounds and to litigate in a federal court. The
question of federal jurisdiction may be resolved by relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (derived
from the Civil Rights Act of 1871). See Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57
GEO. LJ. 1270 (1969).
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to intervene to define necessary procedures or to review the merits
of correctional decisions. 54
The procedures necessary to effect an accommodation between
the principles of legality and penology are not abstruse. Correc-
tional administrators have a substantial body of knowledge de-
veloped in other areas of administrative law upon which to draw.
When correctional authorities have used this knowledge to formu-
late administrative procedures, courts have indicated a willingness
to follow them.155 Furthermore, when administrative decisions
are based on explicit criteria and carefully promulgated rules, the
role of the reviewing court becomes not to decide the validity of
the merits, but merely to judge the legality of the criteria and pro-
cedures used to reach the determination. It is time that prison
administrators took heed of the pervasive controls which, after re-
peated judicial warnings, were eventually imposed upon the po-
lice. Correctional decision-makers must come to realize, just as the
courts are beginning to realize, that:
the correctional agency is not sui generis, but another administra-
tive agency which requires its own administrative law if it is to
make its maximum contributions harmoniously with the values of
the general social order in which it functions.150
JAMES W. GRESENS
154. TAsK FORCE RE-PORT; CORREnCTONS, supra note 61, at 83.
155. Sewell v. Pegelow, 304 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1962). The court required the prisoner-
plaintiffs to follow the established administrative procedures as a prerequisite to judicial
review.
156. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion, supra note 16, at 931.
